Unveiling Saudi Feminism(s): Historicization, Heterogeneity, and Corporeality in Women’s Movements by Lim, Merlyna
Canadian Journal of Communication Vol 43 (2018) 461–479  ©2018 Canadian Journal of
Communication Corporation  http://doi.org/10.22230/cjc.2018v43n3a3379
Merlyna Lim is Canada Research Chair in Digital Media & Global Network Society, ALiGN Media
Lab Director, and Associate Professor in the School of Journalism and Communication at Carleton
University. Email: Merlyna.Lim@carleton.ca .
Unveiling Saudi Feminism(s): Historicization,
Heterogeneity, and Corporeality in
Women’s Movements
Merlyna Lim
Carleton University
ABSTRACT
Background Current Western discourses on women’s movements in Saudi Arabia proffer
an understanding that is adverse to history and sidelines the region’s local knowledges, re-
placing such knowledges with a techno-utopian assumption that technology would produce
better social or political conditions, and exhibit a pattern of disembodiment.
Analysis This article endeavours to disturb ahistorical, monolithic, and disembodied ac-
counts of Saudi women’s movements through three interventions: the historicization of the
Saudi women’s activism and feminist movements; the recognition of the heterogeneity of
Saudi women’s movements; and finally, the acknowledgement of the corporeality of Saudi
women’s resistance.
Conclusion and implications These interventions facilitate a better, more nuanced, and
more contextual understanding of revolutionary and feminist practices, not only in Saudi
Arabia, but also elsewhere in the world.
Keywords  Saudi Arabia; #Women2Drive; Feminism; Technological utopianism; Driving;
Embodiment
RÉSUMÉ
Contexte  Les discours occidentaux actuels dépeignent les mouvements féministes en Arabie
saoudite d’une manière qui est contraire à l’histoire et qui marginalise les savoirs locaux de
la région. Ces discours occidentaux remplacent les savoirs locaux par une approche techno-
utopique selon laquelle la technologie réaliserait de meilleures conditions sociales ou
politiques. Ces discours manifestent en outre une tendance vers la désincarnation.
Analyse  Cet article met en question les comptes rendus ahistoriques, monolithiques et
désincarnés sur les mouvements féministes saoudiens en soulignant : l’historicisation du
militantisme des femmes saoudiennes et des mouvements féministes dans le pays; la
reconnaissance de l’hétérogénéité des mouvements féministes saoudiens; et finalement la
corporalité de la résistance par les femmes saoudiennes.
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Conclusion et implications Ces mises au point permettent une meilleure compréhension,
mieux contextualisée et plus nuancée, de pratiques révolutionnaires et féministes, non
seulement en Arabie saoudite mais aussi ailleurs dans le monde.
Mots clés  Arabie saoudite; #Women2Drive; Féminisme; Utopie technologique; Conduite
automobile; Incarnation
Introduction
In a royal decree issued on September 26, 2017, the Saudi King Salman announced on
state television that he would lift the ban on women driving, granting women the right
to get behind the wheel starting from June 2018 (Kalin & Bayoumy, 2017). The decree
came after a series of activist efforts and campaigns to end the ban, which gained mo-
mentum in 2011. As mass protests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) were
launched in an event popularly called the Arab Spring, a much smaller movement, called
Women2Drive, started in June 2011 to lift the ban on female driving (Al Omran, 2011).
Many forms of gender inequality exist in Saudi Arabia, including the hindrance
of political and economic participation (Al-Rasheed, 2013), but the ban preventing
women from driving has represented a system that keeps women restricted in terms
of both mobility and morality. The ban has both produced and reinforced the domes-
ticity of Saudi women, “whose ultimate role is to demonstrate the piety of the state
and its leading role in maintaining an authentic nation” (Al-Rasheed, 2013, p. 20). The
ban has been perplexing in such a way that it has neither been cultural, legal, nor re-
ligious in nature. The county’s traffic code has never explicitly stated the ban but locally
issued licenses have been required to drive (IBP Inc., 2015). However, in practice, these
licenses are not issued for women, making it effectively illegal for them to drive (IBP
Inc., 2015). The ban has also been enforced by the religious police, mutawa (IBP Inc.,
2015), as well as the state police. Interestingly, women in rural parts and remote villages
of Saudi Arabia, which generally represent families with stricter cultural and religious
values, have been accustomed to driving (Kirk, 2017). However, other women partici-
pating in driving, who have been largely urban residents, have faced arrest and other
disciplinary measures from the state (Murphy, 2008). The ban has, in a sense, become
an unwritten law prohibiting women from driving motor vehicles.
Western media (see Fisher, 2011; Hyde, 2011; Watson, 2011) have misleadingly and
ahistorically categorized the Women2Drive campaign, which encouraged Saudi women
with foreign driver’s licenses to post photos and videos of themselves driving, as an-
other protest in a string of Arab uprisings galvanized by or mobilized through the use
of social media. As Katy Watson (2011) commented in the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) News:
One thing it has in common with the Arab protests is the role social media
played. Through Twitter and Facebook, the ‘Women2Drive’ campaign gave
women a voice for other people to hear. US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton openly supported their cause. Even some of the Saudi royals have
backed what the women are doing. (para. 6) 
Western media’s coverage of the Women2Drive campaign was not different than those
of the Arab uprisings, which commonly incorporated terms such as “Twitter Revolution”
and “Facebook Revolution” (Esseghaier, 2012; Giglio, 2011; Smith, 2011; Vargas, 2012).
Many of these reports have turned “bloggers” and “social media activists” into symbols
of the uprisings, with many, including the Google executive Wael Ghonim and the self-
declared atheist and blogger activist Aliaa Magda Elmahdy, gaining world fame.
Preoccupation with social media also spilled over into academic research.
Scholarly work on the Women2Drive campaign has questioned whether Twitter usage
promoted social progress (Chaudhry, 2014) and argued that digital activism revolu-
tionized Arab women’s struggle for equality and human rights (Sara, 2015; Yuce,
Agarwal, & Wigand, 2013). The interpretations of the events through the prism of
social media were, according to Christian Fuchs (2012), a “search for control, simplicity
and predictability in a situation of high complexity, unpredictability and uncertainty”
(p. 386). They substituted thinking about society with a focus on technology, thus re-
ducing societal problems to a technical level (Fuchs, 2012; Lim, 2012). The techno-
utopian accounts of the Women2Drive campaign resemble much of the early analysis
of the Arab uprisings,1 which proffered an understanding of the MENA movement
that was adverse to history and sidelined the region’s local knowledges, replacing such
knowledges with an assumption that technology would produce better social or polit-
ical conditions (Alrasheed, 2017). Importantly, these accounts obscured historical re-
sources and material actions while shifting attention away from complexities that
inhere within the region (Alrasheed, 2017).
Besides dehistoricization and the erasure of complexity, technologically utopian dis-
courses about social and political movements, such as those of the Arab uprisings and
the Women2Drive campaign, exhibit a pattern of disembodiment. While the human
body is inherent to the formation of any movement (such as bodies protesting, bodies
marching, bodies performing, or bodies driving), it is usually forgotten and alienated in
discussions that focus on technology in investigating social and political movements
(Lim, 2014). This discursive separation, or what Donna Haraway would describe as “du-
alism” (1991), between corporeality and political movements, is a ramification of the
imagination that virtual technologies can be fenced off from the real (Bogard, 1996;
Penny, 1993; Turkle, 1995). Because of this separation between the real and the virtual,
an offshoot of Western modernity’s binary way of knowing (Haraway, 1991), social media
are imagined as possessing qualities removed from people’s behaviour. They are cele-
brated and made distinct from human physical abilities, capabilities, and skills.
In his book The Naked Blogger of Cairo, Marwan Kraidy (2016) has drawn attention
to the role of the “body” in the Arab uprisings. He argues that focusing on new digital
media overshadows the role of old media—the human body, graffiti, poetry, singing—
which animated Arab uprisings in Egypt and Syria a century ago and still continue to
mediate recent Arab rebellion and activism (Kraidy, 2016). Before the internet, people
used their bodies in the French Revolution in 1789 and the Egyptian Revolution of
1919 (Kraidy, 2013). The body is also indispensable in recent Arab activism: 
When Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolated to protest repression and
poverty in Tunisia; when Alia-al-Mahdy posted nude pictures and trans-
gressive text on her “A Rebel’s Diary” blog in Egypt; when peaceful Syrian
protests demonstrated bare-chested to prove they were not concealing
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weapons; they all used their bodies as media in brazenly political behavior
that violated social taboos and political red lines. (Kraidy, 2013, p. 287)
The examples provided by Kraidy all represent radical actions and occurred in life-
threatening conditions: they are “naked” actions. But even if revolutionary and activist
actions are not as bold, strong, and brazen as Bouazizi’s self-immolation or Alia’s nude
pictures, they still rely on the body as a main resource for resistance (Lim, 2018). And
this informs part of this project: how to retell women’s movements in Saudi Arabia,
which seemed to offer more quiet actions than other movements in the region,
through a prism of the body.
The “body” to be incorporated in this narrative, however, is not the Orientalized
body. Infused with a utopian way of speaking about technology evident in discussions
of the MENA movements is an Orientalist imagination of Saudi women as the exotic
“Other” (Said, 1978). A noticeably exotic dimension to media coverage of the recent
Saudi women’s movements revolves around an unveiling of the mysterious.
Photographs juxtaposing Saudi women swathed in traditional long, black veils—
abayas and niqabs2—with modern cars surfaced on mainstream media such as the
Guardian (Malik, 2011), CNN (Jamjoon, 2011), and the Washington Post (Fisher, 2013).
These articles epitomize not only the exotic but also a victimhood discourse in which
women are perceived as oppressed and subjugated by their society and religion
(Ahmed, 1982; Collins, 1991; hooks, 1984; Mohanty, 1988; Spivak, 1988). This sexualiz-
ing and victimizing narrative heightened a binary rhetorical opposition between tra-
dition, as symbolized by the black veil, and modernity, symbolized by cars or
cellphones. Such Orientalist and techno-utopian discursive elements construe a dra-
matic and exciting scene in the Western imaginary, at the cost of the complexity and
history of the culture and the context of women’s movements in Saudi Arabia. This
scene, which combines contrastive elements and reinforces a “demarcation between
East and West” (Said, 1978, p. 39) as well as tradition and modernity, has represented
the movement in reductively techno-utopian and Orientalist terms.
The necessity of conceptualizing the movements otherwise than through the
lenses of Orientalism and technological utopianism suggests that a rethinking of
“agency” (Butler, 1997) is necessary in the context of Saudi women’s  movements.
Drawing on notions that build bridges between structure and agency (Goffman, 1959),
it is revealed that these activists, when opposing current social systems, work within
pre-exiting social and cultural meanings. In this context, the concept of “performance”
can be used to reassess how the women’s movements are understood, drawing atten-
tion to “shared knowledge needed for these performances” and “existing repertoires
of meaning” (Fuist, 2014, p. 429).  It also can steer attention to the role of the body
(and its extensions) in modifying existing meaning systems—signs, symbols, and rep-
resentations of the movement. 
The analytical tools employed for this article can be summarized as follows:
Using historical analysis as a perspective to situate current events, thus1.
discovering points of reference in which experiences of the past resonate
(or not) with the present.
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Employing a critical perspective through which to step further away from2.
dominant Western narratives of the Saudi women’s movement due to
their failure to observe the complexity and heterogeneity of the move-
ments and their cultural and social contexts. 
Adopting performativity as an analytical lens.3.
Utilizing critical discourse and historical analyses as the chief methods, this article
privileges voices from scholars and activists in Saudi Arabia, and their arguments are
not subsumed into dominant academic discourse originating from Western scholars
and feminists. This article also relies on different sources of data, including academic
texts and media commentaries produced by the regions’ academics and activists, jour-
nalistic accounts, Saudi creative productions, and social media conversations and de-
bates produced by different Saudi actors engaged with the movements.
There is a dilemma facing many academics writing on Middle Eastern women or
activists: the dilemma of producing work that can portray MENA women as complex
agents while fighting against negative regional representations and local patriarchy.
This dilemma is beyond the scope of this article and better left to Saudi activists.
Therefore, the question of which forms of Saudi feminism are legitimate and which
are not is avoided here.
To sum up, to produce a better understanding of the women’s movements in Saudi
Arabia, Orientalist and techno-utopian narratives that overlook the role of stories, his-
tories, voices, and women’s bodies in Saudi women’s struggles—and also portray those
women as silent mythical creatures prior to the introduction of social media—must be
abandoned. This does not entail sidelining how digital media shapes political and social
practices, but in order to develop a critical understanding of new media and an infor-
mative account of MENA’s cultural and political complexities, new media must be con-
textualized in their historical, political, social, and bodily dynamics, and the development
of new media use must also be understood with geopolitical and historical sensibility.
In this way, new media are not seen as ahistorical objects but as ones that are embedded
in historical accounts and perceived as developments with local precedents.
Attempting to achieve this goal, this article endeavours to disturb rigid accounts
of Saudi women’s movements through three interventions: historicizing Saudi women’s
movements, and highlighting in these historical accounts the ambivalent interaction
between local media and Saudi women; recognizing and highlighting the heterogeneity
of Saudi women’s movements; and finally, acknowledging the corporeality, the re-
sourcefulness of the body for Saudi women’s resistance even with the use of new media. 
Historicizing the movement
Social movements are historical social phenomena (Sogge & Dutting, 2010) and their
media use are shaped by historical conditions. To fully understand “their politics,
choice of strategies, and the meaning and impact of their presence and actions” (Horn,
2013, p. 19), movements need to be read in their historical context.
The Women2Drive campaign is not a new kind of movement. It has a history ex-
tending back to Saudi driving activism in the 1990s and wider Arab women’s move-
ments earlier in the century. It can be more accurately described as another
manifestation of forms of resistance that have marked women’s struggles in Saudi
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Arabia and in the region periodically since the early twentieth century. Two years prior
to the 2011 driving movement, female activists in Saudi Arabia launched a project called
We the Women and produced and distributed stickers with messages, such as “To drive,
or not to drive, that is the question” and “I don’t like the backseat” (Mackey, 2009), to
raise awareness about the driving ban. In 2008, Al-Huwaider, a known Saudi activist,
drove in Riyadh and posted a video on YouTube of herself driving (Yes2WomenDriving,
2008). In the preceding year, she and another activist formed the Association for the
Protection and Defense of Women’s Rights in Saudi Arabia and sent a petition to King
Abdullah with 1,100 signatures supporting Saudi women’s right to drive (Agarwal, Lim,
& Wigand, 2012). Beyond the right to drive, Al-Huwaider’s online campaign revolved
around women’s rights in general. Her online writings intimately analyzed the position
of women in Arab society, in which she criticized the status of human rights and
protested discriminations and violence against women (Agarwal, Lim, & Wigand, 2011).
In December 2005, approximately 20 women gathered in Riyadh to commemorate
their defiance of the ban fifteen years prior, on November 6, 1990 (Ambah, 2005),
which is another important date in the history of women’s struggle in the country. On
that particular date, prior to the emergence of social media, 47 Saudi women
in  Riyadh  drove their cars in protest against the driving ban.  They were imprisoned
for one day and had their passports seized, with some losing their jobs as a result of
the protest (Al Tamimi, 2012).
The 1990s driving campaign took place during the Gulf War, with the presence of
American troops in Saudi Arabia. In recalling her days prior to the driving campaign,
Aisha Al-Mana, one of the campaign participants in the 1990s, said:
Our main obstacle was mobility … This was November 1990, during the
Kuwait War. I had recently been traveling from Bahrain to Dhahran, and
I passed a convoy of American troops. I saw American women driving
trucks. And I can’t even drive my car? I said to myself, “I’m going to drive
and tell the Americans to go back home.” Americans here are doing what-
ever they want. They talk about democracy. It’s democratic for them, but
not for us. (cited in Danforth, 2016, p. 66)
Watching female American soldiers driving trucks and mobilizing in Saudi Arabia at
the outset of the Gulf War emboldened Al-Mana to defy the ban in the hope of limiting
the control of American troops on her land while enhancing her own mobility.
Resentment against American imperialistic notions of freedom uttered by Al-Mana,
also shared by other “women drivers,” was another notable source of the driving cam-
paign. Even years later, some of the drivers still held resentment against the United
States. In an interview with the New York Times in 2002, one driver said, “Americans
are always saying they’re concerned with freedom and the democratic will of people
… But they didn’t care about what was happening inside our country in 1990. And
they still don’t care. We are seen only as the ladies in black” (Dowd, 2002, para. 20).
The struggle against hyper-masculine laws has roots in earlier struggles of Saudi
women and particularly in 1990s activism focused on driving. However, it can also be
located in the subversive heritage of Arab women. In 1919, Huda Sha’arawi, an Egyptian
feminist, openly challenged the lack of women’s participation in public and political
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spaces by organizing the largest women’s demonstration against the British colonial
state (Deb, 2016). Although the movement was led by elite women, such as Huda
Sha’arawi, women in villages also participated in anti-colonial work, such as “the de-
struction of railway lines and other acts of sabotage” (Deb, 2016, p. 180). In the same
way that the Saudi women’s driving protest occurred as a reaction to the sight of female
American soldiers driving in Saudi Arabia, women’s impairment of British railways in
Egypt symbolized a struggle for free territory liberated from the colonizer, and a desire
to limit the colonizer’s mobility while widening colonized women’s terrains.
This is not to say that this anti-colonial history was the main source for the ideol-
ogy of feminism in Saudi Arabia. Rather, it is to situate the Saudi struggle for women’s
rights in the region’s long-standing female-led struggle and highlight similarities be-
tween the two forms of resistance. The tradition of dissidence against patriarchal sys-
tems dates back to the liberation era from colonialism in the early nineteenth century
and that era’s subsequent formation of a heterogeneous collection of women’s move-
ments raising awareness of the socio-political conditions that limit women’s equality
or participation.
Chronicling media
Investigating the wider history of Saudi women’s struggles to carve a space in political
and social life, this article underscores a complex relationship between these struggles
and media. This relationship has been hugely shaped by political, social, and economic
exigencies. Saudi women’s involvement in public media can be traced to the role of
female newspaper writers in the 1940s, when pages dedicated to women started to
emerge and women often edited these sections (Al-Sudairy, 2017). The Kuraish news-
paper’s women pages, for example, had a few female editors, even though their names
were never mentioned. In an account of Saudi women’s feminism, Hatoon Al Fassi
(2016) indicates that the presence of women in the press was publicly known when
Latifah Alkhatib published articles in the newspaper Sahifat Albilad under her real
name in 1951, followed by Thuria Qabel in 1959, at a time when many women chose
to publish under a pseudonym (Al-Sudairy, 2017). Both Alkhatib and Qabel’s writings
showed a social and collective sense of justice on behalf of women. For example, in
one of her essays Alkhatib demanded a maternity hospital (Al-Sudairy, 2017).
During the 1950s, more Saudi women joined Alkhatib in writing for national news-
papers. The expansion of education for girls in the 1950s caused a noticeable growth in
women’s literary participation. The development of women’s presence and participation,
however, went through a drawback during the 1980s. The siege of the Grand Mosque
in Makkah by the tribal and religious militant Juhaiman Alotaibi in 1979 had an influ-
ence in limiting the presence of women in media (Al Fassi, 2016). The extremist insur-
gents of Alotaibi’s group called for the overthrow of the Saudi royal family and
advocated a return to the puritan way of Islam, a rejection of Westernization and an
abolishment of Western new media, such as television. After two weeks, the siege ended,
but the event had a deep impact, especially on women’s participation in Saudi Arabia.
The main impact of the crisis crystalized around the appearance of women on television
and their engagement in public spheres (Al Fassi, 2016). Subsequently, the media started
to embody a restrictive space limiting women’s participation and empowerment.
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The lack of women’s presence in public media did not mark an absolute end to
Saudi feminism but can be seen as discursive interventions occurring across stretches
of time. Despite the fact that women’s media presence was restricted, religious and ed-
ucational spaces were more available to them. According to Nora Doaiji (2017), while
the state aligned itself more clearly with the Saudi Islamism group known as the
Sahwa3 after the siege of Makkah, lower oil prices due to the Gulf War led to the accel-
eration of Saudization policies and thus an increase in Saudi women’s employment in
educational and religious sectors. During this period, Saudi Islamist feminists began
to emerge as “celebrities” and respected icons in society (Doaiji, 2017). These women
were hugely influenced by the Sahwa, but also “maintained their own agency in female
spaces and formulated their own Islamic feminist critiques” (Doaiji, 2017, p. 4).
The post-1980 era was more than a setback in women’s participation; it was a mo-
ment that enabled the conjecture of different discourses, inscribing, transforming, and
reinforcing the travesty of Saudi feminism. While the moment served as a temporal de-
terrence to liberal feminism, it conjoined it with different narratives, mainly nationalism
and Islamism. Further, it produced long negotiations of the tropes and metaphors born
of these narratives, such as the metaphor of Saudi women being “queens” served by
males that is championed by Saudi conservatives (Doaiji, 2017). Although conservatives
and Islamists produced the image, actors in other feminist discourses continually engaged
with it (Doaiji, 2017). Feminist activists have ridiculed this metaphor by memes, GIFs,
and hashtags. They have also celebrated feminist achievements by referring to the trope
of “queen.” In her book Daring to Drive, Manal Al-Sharif (2017) states, “The Saudi men
call women ‘queens,’ and say that queens don’t drive. Women often mock this title by
saying ‘The kingdom of one king and millions of queens’” (p. 10). During Queen
Elizabeth’s visit to Saudi Arabia, a photo of her driving her jaguar was also circulated
around on social media with comments such as “real queens drive” (Al-Sharif, 2017).
Observing heterogeneity
Despite their embeddedness in a historical struggle, Saudi feminist movements cannot
be described as a spin-off of one source of knowledge. They are, rather, a repository of
different knowledges and a conjuncture of intersecting forces. Many discussions of the
recent Saudi women’s movements have pointed out that the conceptions of gender
in Saudi Arabia are underpinned by a shared understanding invoked by Islam (see
Calamur, 2017; Farrell, 2017). Particularly, Wahhabism4 is framed as “an ahistorical co-
herent corpus of religious knowledge that is responsible for persistent exclusion of
Saudi women” (Al-Rasheed, 2013, p. 16), a conception built on the assumed polarity
between the West and Islam. Contrary to this conception, which dehistoricizes a much
more complex world and simplifies the experience of Saudi women, Saudi women’s
movements embody different strands and ideologies rather than one coherent ap-
proach with shared tenets and objectives. Feminism in Saudi Arabia is multiple, a site
for different and intertwined forms of knowledge. There is, therefore, no uniform fem-
inism. Saudi feminism(s), instead, is shaped by different ways of knowing and modes
of engagement with gender and women’s issues, as well as different social and political
developments. This article highlights four of these feminist trends and identifies the
different beliefs serving as their foundations.
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Legal 
The first group of female activists focus on the legal dimensions of feminism. They en-
deavour to empower women by challenging patriarchal laws. Alongside Aysha
Alamena, Wajeha Al-Huwaider and Fawzia Al-Oyouni have also worked on women’s
rights. They are known for their attempt to help a Canadian woman, Nathalie Morin,
who was subjected to abuse by her Saudi husband. The criminal court in Al Khobar
province charged the two activists with instigating the wife against her husband and
attempting to smuggle her and her kids out of the country (HRW, 2013).5 The two ac-
tivists were sentenced to two months in prison and a two-year travel ban (HRW, 2013).
In 2008, Al-Huwaider also participated in activism and gained media attention for her
work. In one interview, she insisted that gender inequality is an outcome of a legal sys-
tem that renders Saudi women dependent and vulnerable (Zordiask, 2012). Al-
Huwaider further argued that once these legal issues are corrected, women’s rights
will be normalized in Saudi society (Zordiask, 2012).
Another activist, Hala Al-Dosari, participated in the Women2Drive campaign and
her writings were featured in different media outlets, including the Guardian (Al-
Dosari, 2016) and Aljazeera (Al-Dosari, 2011). Besides voicing her critique in the media
and defying the driving ban (focusing on the legality of empowerment), she directs a
women’s rights advocacy project, Aminah, through which she offers information to
women about human rights and ways women can take advantage of holes or gaps in
Saudi legal systems (see Aminah, 2018).
Political
Another approach advocated by Saudi women activists is politically, rather than legally,
mobilized. Madawi Al-Rasheed (2013), an academic in King’s College, mainly posits
that neither Islam nor tribal ethos explains gender inequality in Saudi Arabia. She ar-
gues instead that the marriage of nationalism and religion makes women symbols for
the nation, similar to the role of secular nationalism in non-Arab countries. As with
secular nationalism, religious nationalism singles out women as pillars of a nation’s
imagined communities (Al-Rasheed, 2013). Both imaginations are dominated by
“women questions” despite differences in legitimation narratives, motives, and solu-
tions (Al-Rasheed, 2013).
In this context, the state forged a convergence of tribal ethos, the Wahhabi tradi-
tion and its ideologues, and the obedience to the monarchy to keep women in patri-
archal relationships as part of the imagining of a Saudi nation (Al-Rasheed, 2013).
Obsession with women, their bodies, and segregation, therefore, reflects the process
of defining national boundaries important to the state and to the maintenance of their
legitimacy.
Cultural
The third strand exists not on political or legal understandings, but it affirms that women
face misogynistic religion and a male-dominated culture. Actors in this discourse inter-
pret misogyny as a cultural and religious issue. Among them is Mona Eltahawy (2012),
an Egyptian woman who lived part of her life in Saudi Arabia. In an article for Foreign
Policy entitled “Why They Hate Us,” she writes, “Name me an Arab country, and I’ll recite
Lim Unveiling 469
a litany of abuses fueled by a toxic mix of culture and religion that few seem willing or
able to disentangle lest they blaspheme or offend” (para. 6).
This circle of feminists, largely critical of cultural and religious components of
misogyny, is various. While Eltahawy rejects Western patriarchy, this circle also includes
groups of activists who describe themselves as ex-Muslims and have sought asylum
in Britain or the U.S. Many tell stories of abuse they were subjected to when in Saudi
Arabia. CNN (2017) recently published “The Saudi Women Afraid to Go Home,” inter-
viewing three of these women. In their call for women’s liberation, some of these fem-
inists invoke an Oriental voice and align themselves with right-wing politics. Following
the texts produced by many of them reveals that some have displayed support for alt-
right members, including Paul Joseph Watson, a vlogger based in England known for
promoting alt-right rhetoric.
Islamic
The fourth group includes those who work to empower women through religious so-
lutions and who believe they should work within Islamic frameworks to achieve that.
They situate women’s emancipation within an Islamic framework and invoke Islamic
teachings as ideal solutions for gender issues and social problems in Saudi society.
While the previous group draws on a utopian and ahistorical understanding of Western
liberalism, this group poignantly reinforces a utopian understanding of Islam and re-
iterates that Islamic teaching responds to any modern dilemma. Nawal Aleid, Rugayah
Almuhareb, Asmaa Alrwaished, and Noura Assad are the most prominent academic
names associated with this discourse and are described as being against women’s rights
by liberal Saudi feminists (Hijazi, 2004). They have fought against the introduction of
sexual harassment laws because they understand them to be a means to normalize a
more open society (Hijazi, 2004). They have rejected any call for lifting the ban on
women’s driving, describing the campaign as an elitist one aimed to serve upper-class
women (Hijazi, 2004). However, Islamic feminists have also concerned themselves
with other women’s issues. They have made explicit demands focusing on the struggle
of divorced and widowed women, demanding salaries for housewives and support for
mothers (Hijazi, 2004). They have also continually urged the state to expand female
employment in all-women spaces.
While many ignore this group’s role in shaping women’s rights in Saudi Arabia, it
is the most active in producing academic scholarship on women’s rights that is guided
by Islamic principles (Algofaily, 2016). They have, for example, established a centre
for women’s rights in Riyadh with the goals of, according to the centre’s website, “build-
ing a positive public opinion towards women’s issues” and “providing intellectual and
scientific support for women active in their communities” (Bahethat, 2017, n.p.).
Al-Rasheed (2013) highlights that Islamist women, just as liberal women, have as-
serted a niche in the public sphere. They have contributed regularly to political, social,
and economic problems relevant to them as women. Unlike liberal feminists, they
have located the roots of discrimination in social norms rather than religious teachings.
Therefore, they have avoided a critical reading of Islamic fatwas or confrontation with
religious scholars (Al-Rasheed, 2013).
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While plurality is a positive phenomenon, it also leads to a level of contentiousness
that may hinder solidarity among different feminist circles. Such division and frag-
mentation are also reflected online. Despite promises of online spaces as deliberative,
networked public spheres (Jenkins, 2006; Papacharissi, 2009), these promises have
not been fulfilled for the feminist groups referred to. While many members of these
groups have engaged in online debates about the nature of feminism (Doaiji, 2017),
women’s empowerment, femininity, religion, law, the state, the West, and other issues
and actors relevant to Saudi feminism, they have neither reached any coherence nor
consensus. A wide range of feminisms and the fragmented online environment have
collectively made the discord more conspicuous. 
Corporeality: Embodying and performing the movements 
Technological utopian discourses of Saudi women’s movements have noticeably de-
tached the role of the body from these movements. Although the human body is es-
sential in protests and critical to understanding the cultural and material nuances of
social movements (Lim, 2018), the role of body in women’s movements in Saudi Arabia
have been widely neglected in the discussions surrounding them. This article aims to
counter this dissipation of the body by incorporating an analysis of the corporeal as
an anchor of resistance knowledge and action in Saudi women’s movements.
In order to highlight the corporeal elements of Saudi women’s movements, they
are examined from the perspective of performance (Butler, 1979; Fuist, 2014).
Performances, in what Todd Fuist (2014) specifically calls ideological performance, offer
a “possible shift toward a more grounded, interactional understanding” (p. 427) of
movements. Here, ideological performances are not only public and conscious perfor-
mances found in large-scale movements but they also include private and “regular
parts of our interactive world” (p. 433). Such concepts proffer an opportunity to ob-
serve how performances rely on aesthetics, humour, clothing, references, symbols, and
knowledges, and locates through these both performers and audiences in shared mean-
ing systems (Fuist, 2014). Performance theories, such as that of Fuist, also steer atten-
tion to the role of the body (and its extensions) in mediating and modifying existing
meaning systems, and thus they provide a holistic, rather than fragmentary or binary,
vision of media and human bodies.
Performances and the presence of the body are compared in three recent devel-
opments of the demand for freedom of women’s mobility: the Women2Drive move-
ment, the creative spaces of Wadjda and Hwages, both are videos produced by Saudi
filmmakers/artists, and, finally, the 2017 silent walking protest. A comparison between
the three demonstrates a shift toward more “embodiment” in the past decade, from
driving, represented in the Women2Drive movement, to cycling, shown in Wadjda and
Hwages, and then walking, represented by the 2017 silent walking protest. While the
demand for driving is ongoing, the body in the course of feminist movements in Saudi
Arabia has become more engaged and active in creating meaning and performing so-
cial action. Automotive mobility was at the forefront in the earlier stages. However,
the machine became simpler, by turning into a bicycle, and then, in the latest form of
resistance, it disappeared altogether as a tool of protest.
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The driver 
The Women2Drive campaign was active for several years as women mounted pressure
on the government to lift the ban on driving. From the 1990s, there were reports of
scattered incidents in which women were caught driving and some were even reported
to have died in car accidents while attempting to drive (see Al Arabiya News, 2008;
BBC News, 2009). The campaign, however, gained new momentum in 2011 when
around fifty women took to the streets, many in the company of relatives and friends.
Their companions were a source of support for the drivers and, in some cases, video-
taped them. The campaign occurred in different locations in Saudi Arabia’s big cities
and the main prerequisite for participation was holding a driver’s license from another
country. Throughout its years, the campaign maintained rules for its participants, such
as maintaining the legality of action (that the participants should be technically al-
lowed to drive by having driver’s licenses), driving only during the day, avoiding direct
confrontation with the government, and avoiding gathering in central locations to
avoid the pitfall of the 1990 dissent (Women2Drive, 2012).
While face visibility was not a requirement for the movement (many drivers wore
their niqabs), the participants maintained dialogues with their companions. Eman
Alnajfan, an activist in the campaign, could not drive herself but asked another woman,
Azza Alshmasi, to drive her through the city of Riyadh (Al Omran, 2011). During the
ride, Alnajfan videotaped the driver, the streets they passed, and the driver’s three kids,
who sat in the back. Alnajfan also made comments during the ride on Alshmasi’s ex-
cellent capabilities as a driver and the fact that the kids were wearing safety belts. She
and the driver also commented on the reactions of other drivers to seeing a woman
driving.
The campaign also relied on the visibility of speakers, especially in international
media, to propagate their message. For example, Loujain Alhathloul, an activist and
the face of the 2013 driving campaign, was arrested and detained for more than two
months in December 2014 for defying the female driving ban after attempting to cross
the border in her car from the United Arab Emirates to Saudi Arabia. Global media
widely followed her arrest and release. She was interviewed for a PBS documentary
on Saudi Arabia, titled Saudi Arabia Uncovered (Jones, 2016). Manal Alsharif, an orga-
nizer of the Women2Drive campaign, who was detained after driving a car in the city
of Dammam in May 2011, was also a visible speaker. Her detention was covered by
global media. In June 2012, following an invitation to speak at the Oslo Freedom Forum
and to receive the Vaclav Havel Prize for Creative Dissent, Alsharif revealed that she
had received death threats. She was also stigmatized as a traitor following her Oslo
speech (Pizano, 2012).
The body was constantly present in the Women2Drive campaign, with its main
role being to drive and operate the car; however, the body was unmarked. In other
words, the actions of the body, other than driving, were not meant to stir a reaction.
While the campaign was definitely feminist, it did not hold to the radical exclusion of
men. Male relatives accompanied many participants, such as Loujain Alhathloul and
Maha Alqahtani—a mixed-gender composition strategy to attract as much public sup-
port as possible and deter any social or political backlash.
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The cyclist
The Saudi women’s demand for freedom of mobility has become more embodied,
metamorphosing from a narrative of driving to one of cycling. Wadjda (Al-Mansour,
2014), directed by Haifaa Al-Mansour, the first Saudi woman to direct a feature film
inside Saudi Arabia, is about an eleven-year-old girl named Wadjda who dreams of
owning a bicycle. The bicycle’s cost is Wadjda’s main worry, until her school announces
a $1,000 prize for a Quran reciting competition. While not labelling it as a feminist
protest movie, the director makes clear that the movie is meant to be part of a wider
debate on women’s rights in Saudi Arabia: “I wanted to have a voice, and I wanted to
say something” (Harrod, 2013, para. 7). Similar to the driving campaign, the movie
steers clear of any specific political critique. It expresses Saudi women’s mobility
grievances, but clearly aligns itself with the state rather than against it. During the final
scene of the movie, for example, while Wadjda is happily riding her bike, she passes
by a bus with a placard on its back showing the Saudi flag along with pictures of the
late king, crown prince, and deputy prime minister. It bears the words “May continue
to prosper, our homeland” in what seems to be a declaration of loyalty to the govern-
ment. Also, similar to the driving campaign, the movie does not render men the root
cause of the oppression. While Wadjda is the protagonist of the movie, men (and boys)
do not act as a source of control. They do not impose direct control over Wadjda.
Rather, the social system restrains her and her mother. For example, Wadjda’s female
teachers act as a counter to Wadjda’s freedom and exert more control over her than
the other male characters in the movie.
The body in Wadjda, however, represents a more active role than in the driving
campaign. The bicycle as a machine is less complex than the car, and it relies mainly
on human power in order to work. So, the human body becomes more prominent.
Challenging social orders, Mansour makes the heroine salient in the title of the movie,
its poster, and throughout its story. Wadjda appears in the poster with jeans and a shirt
while wearing an open abaya and posing in a way that suggests typical masculinity:
her facial expressions are without a smile and her legs are wide apart. She stands in a
public road that evokes Riyadh’s streets. Such a pose symbolizes the occupation of
Saudi male space and a disturbance of the codes that allocate public spaces to men
and private ones to women. Here, Wadjda takes centre stage, without a male compan-
ion, outside the domestic sphere, thus undermining male domination. However,
stretching the limits of female space, Mansour also soothes the message by utilizing a
child in this narrative—one who, in the Saudi media landscape, is not typically asso-
ciated with sexualized discourses and is also relieved of adult social conscience.
Feminist presence can be further normalized by integrating the demand for mo-
bility with traditionalism in a comic style of communication, as in the song video by
Majed Al-Esa, Hwages (Al-Esa, 2016). In this video, women in abayas and niqabs appear
in the backseat of a car with a child driver, mocking the gender hierarchy of the society.
These women quickly appear out of the car, lifting their abayas to reveal traditional
coloured garments, called Rose, while running, skateboarding, playing basketball, and
biking. All of this is accompanied by the chorus of folklore with satirical lyrics sung by
older women in the region. “May all men vanish / May all men vanish / They caused
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us psychological illnesses / They caused us psychological illnesses.” The feminist view
adopted in the video ascribes patriarchal roots to “men.” The two men in the video
wave fingers at the women to threaten, restrict, and stop them. They also continually
show off their own privilege by flying and driving without guardians and holding po-
litical offices.
One trope worth noting in this video is the linkage between the nostalgic, through
traditional clothing and music, and the attempts to rebuild such a past using untradi-
tional female roles; women in their traditional clothing are not cooking or nurturing
their families but instead skateboarding, biking, and playing basketball. The usage of
feminist folklore lyrics also demonstrates an attempt to localize feminism and portray
it as a familiar social trope rather than a Western imposed ideology.
The walker
In April 2017, a number of short video clips showing women walking surfaced online.
These clips contained footage of Saudi women campaigners who had filmed them-
selves silently walking in the street without male guardians as part of their fight to
drive (Roberts, 2017). Some of these videos emerged on social media with the hashtag
#resistancebywalking in Arabic and English. Silent walking, a new form of resistance
employed by female activists in this 2017 protest, explicitly demonstrates the centrality
of the body in Saudi women’s activism. Female bodies do not habitually appear in the
public streets of Riyadh and other Saudi cities. If there is a body in the public space, it
is masculine; and the body in the private sphere is feminine. Walking is symbolic of
women taking part in a practice that is usually associated with males. By “entering
the public realm women seem to be bringing with them a principle of reality into this
sphere, namely the necessities which originate with having a body … [which] have no
place in the public” (Benhabib, 1993, p. 98).
The silence of the activists while walking was an aesthetic expression but also
symbolic on two levels. Accompanied by the activists’ fixed look toward their cell-
phone cameras (thus their viewers), the silence had an emotive force in both delivering
the anger of the activists and highlighting the absurdity of the restrictions placed on
women. It seemed as if there were no need for words to justify the obvious right of
women to mobilize; the silence also had the discursive function of interrupting, paus-
ing, and creating a gap in the noise and contention surrounding women’s rights in the
Kingdom, which may have suppressed local women’s voices. This silence ironically
opens space for women to speak up and make their voices heard.
The silence of the walking was followed by online commotion, so to speak. Here
online spaces functioned as extensions of the offline. Many women, including the ac-
tivists themselves, reacted and expressed their opinions on the new movement. Using
the handle @ms_freespeech, Mariam Alhubail, the campaign organizer, tweeted: “We
want to encourage women to go out alone for a walk or to do their daily tasks and
reject the idea men take care of these tasks” (cited in Roberts, 2017, n.p.). In another
tweet, she added, “I walk alone. Until we have the streets again” (cited in Roberts, 2017,
n.p.). Other women followed suit. A tweet from Ms Saffaa (@MsSaffaa) stated,
“Everyday acts of resistance. #Saudi women walking everywhere since driving and
peaceful protests are banned” (Saffaa, 2017). Meanwhile, Manahel Aloatibi @1994_the-
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freedom tweeted, “They don’t mind me crossing the streets on foot. What matters to
them is that I shouldn’t drive and that I don’t become my own guardian” (translated
from Arabic) (Aloatibi, 2017).
What speaks volumes from this online action is not the tweets themselves, but
the fact that these women activists curated a site for their bodies to act together. By
posting their videos and tweets in concert, they created “the polis” for the “space of
appearance” (Arendt, 1958) where one appeared to others as others appeared to one.
The curated social media space was then made political by the capacity of these
women to act together for a public political purpose, which is what Hannah Arendt
(1958) calls power. Bodies online and offline, together they turned “an invisible resis-
tance into a visual spectacle” and converted “grievances into a display of collective
power” (Lim, 2018, p. 126).    
Conclusion
Technological lenses may lead to a skewed reading of society as they acutely centre on
the characteristics and features of the associated technology, overshadowing more
complex issues related to culture, politics, and social dynamics. Moreover, they tend
to erase historical contexts and, subsequently, render human agency invisible. This ar-
ticle repositions women, their acts, and their agency from the margin to the centre in
an analysis of Saudi women’s movements. Following Colombian scholar Jesús Martín-
Barbero, in this article the Saudi women are read as “active, intelligent, and tactical
beings who are fully capable of disrupting, subverting, resisting, and appropriating
media processes and messages” (cited in Richardson, 1994, p. 1).
Steering away from technological utopianism as well as an Orientalist framework,
this article offers a nuanced, historically grounded reading of Saudi’s women’s move-
ments by privileging the histories, voices, and bodies of the Saudi women and cen-
trally incorporating them into the analysis. Historicizing the movements not only
reveals different nuances of Saudi women’s movements, it also demonstrates how dif-
ferent discourses inscribe, transform, and reinforce the formation and trajectory of
Saudi feminism. In highlighting and recognizing the heterogeneity of Saudi feminism,
we identify legal, political, cultural, and Islamic feminisms and ascertain how these
different ways of knowing and modes of engagement become a resource for Saudi
women’s movements. And, lastly, the analysis of the movement’s performance in this
article has not only highlighted the potency and efficacy of the body in Saudi women’s
movements—which has become even more prominent with the development of the
movement—but it also brings out the social, political and gender dimensions of the
movements. Beyond the Saudi women’s movements, the analytical and intervening
repertoires—historicization, heterogeneity, and corporeality—are important in facilitat-
ing a richer, more nuanced, and more contextual understanding of revolutionary and
feminist practices, not only in the MENA region, but also elsewhere in the world. 
Notes
1. Examples include Breuer & Groshek, 2014; Frangonikolopoulos & Chapsos, 2014; Soengas-Pérez, 2013.
2. Abaya is a simple, loose over-garment worn by some women in parts of the Muslim world, including
the Middle East and North Africa. A traditional abaya is black and covers the whole body except the
head, feet, and hands. It is sometimes worn with niqab, a face veil covering all but the eyes.
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3. The Sahwa (meaning the awakening) is a political religious movement that gained its momentum
in the 1990s. It was a fusion of both Wahhabi and the Muslim Brotherhood movements and mainly
calls for a return to the tradition of prophet Muhammad and his companions. For more on the Sahwa,
see Lacroix (2011). 
4. Founded by Mohammed Ibn Al-Wahhab (1703–1792), Wahhabism is an Islamic doctrine and reli-
gious movement attempting to restore pure monotheistic worship or tahwid in Islam. It stresses the
absolute sovereignty of God and advocates a return to the purity of the first-generation Islam, the salaf.
It also rejects any reliance on the intercession of the Prophet Mohammed and denounces pilgrimages
to saints’ tombs. Today, Wahhabi teachings are the official, state-sponsored form of Sunni Islam in
Saudi Arabia.      
5. According to an article published in January 2015 in Le Journal de Montréal (Maher, 2015), Morin was
still held in Saudi Arabia. By the time of writing of this article, there is no further update on her story.  
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